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Impact Whether Title VII's
Definition of "Employer" Imposes
Individual Liability Upon an Agent
Williams v. Banning'
I. INTRODUCTION
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19642 ("Title VII") prohibits
employment discrimination Although no question exists that "employers" are
liable for their discriminatory acts as well as for their agents' acts that occur
within the scope of employment,4 a conflict exists among the federal circuits
regarding whether Title VII's definition of "employer" also imposes individual
liability upon the employer's agent.5 The Seventh Circuit answered this
question for its circuit in Williams v. Banning.'
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Karen Williams ("Williams") was employed as a secretary for Calument
Construction Corporation ("CCC").7 From November 1993 through March
1994, Bruce Banning ("Banning") worked as her supervisor.' Throughout this
time, Banning allegedly sexually harassed9 Williams at the job site.' ° When
1. 72 F.3d 552 (7th Cir. 1995).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1994).
3. See infra note 21 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 74-83 and accompanying text.
6. 72 F.3d 552 (7th Cir. 1995).
7. Id. at 553.
8. Id.
9. Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1994),
prohibits sex discrimination which includes sexual harassment. See, e.g., Harris v.
Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 370 (1993) and Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477
U.S. 57, 65 (1986).
Sexual harassment occurs either (1) where an employer's actions create a hostile
work environment, see Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 370 and Meritor, 477 U.S. at 66, or (2)
where the employer conditions employment benefits upon sexual demands (otherwise
termed the "quid pro quo theory,"), see Meritor, 477 U.S. at 66.
1
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Williams rejected Banning's advances, he apparently retaliated against her by
criticizing her work performance."
Initially, Williams reported these events to CCC's Human Resources
department but asked that her complaint be kept confidential. 2 Then, in
March 1994, Williams informed Human Resources that she could no longer
work with Banning. 3 As a result, CCC investigated her complaint and
suspended Banning on March 29, 1994.14 Although Williams continues to
work for CCC, Banning has left their employment.
Williams brought a Title VII action against Banning in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Indiana alleging sexual harassment
in the workplace. 6 Banning filed a motion to dismiss, 7 arguing that Title VII
did not apply to him in his individual capacity. In granting Banning's motion
to dismiss, the district court ruled that Title VII could not impose individual
liability on Banning because he did not independently meet Title ViI's
definition of employer."
Williams appealed this ruling to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit.'9 In affirming the lower court, the Seventh Circuit
interpreted Title VII and its 1991 amendments' silence on the issue of
individual liability. The Seventh Circuit held that Title VII does not impose
individual liability on an employer's agent for acts violative of the statute.20
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Interpreting Title VII and the 1991 Amendments
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196421 ("Title VII") prohibits
discrimination concerning "compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
10. Banning, 72 F.3d at 553. This harassment included unwanted physical contact
such as "touching Williams's breasts and legs, kissing her, and other sexual advances







17. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
18. Banning, 72 F.3d at 553.
19. Id.
20. Id at 555.
21. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1994).
[Vol. 62
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employment" on the basis of "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. '
Title VII provides potential relief to discrimination victims in the form of
compensatory and punitive damages' as well as the equitable remedies of
back pay, reinstatement and injunction.24
In general, no question exists that "employers" violating Title VII are
liable for their discriminatory acts25 as well as for their "agents"' violations
occurring within the scope of employment.26 However, significant confusion
abounds amongst the federal judiciary regarding the meaning of "employer"
and "agent" and these definitions' corresponding impact on liability under
Title VII?'
Neither Title VII nor its 1991 amendments explicitly address individual
liability.28 The lower federal courts have adopted various approaches to
answer this statutory question. These approaches primarily include examining
the statute's plain language, the legislative purpose, as well as the resulting
policy consequences from either accepting or rejecting individual liability.29
In considering the plain language of the statute, Title VII defines an
"employer" as "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has
fifteen or more employees.., and any agent of such person."3 Based on
22. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (1994).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5(g) (1994).
25. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 523-24 (1993) (holding
that employers that engage in discriminatory employment actions are liable for
damages under Title VII).
26. See Pommier v. James L. Edelstein Enters., 816 F. Supp. 476, 481 (N.D. Ill.
1993) (holding the employer liable under Title VII for agent's discriminatory acts);
Barger v. Kansas, 630 F. Supp. 88, 92 (D. Kan. 1985) (stating that employers are
subject to suit for discriminatory acts of their agents).
27. See infra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
28. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1-2000e-17 (1994). Individual liability signifies, in this
context, the liability of individuals "who do not otherwise meet the statutory definition
of employer." EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1276, 1282 (7th Cir.
1995).
29. WILLIAM D. PoPKIN, MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: POLmICAL LANGUAGE
AND THE POLITICAL PROCESs §§ 8.03, 9.02 (1993). Professor Popkin establishes a
framework for statutory interpretation: (1) the writer approach which focuses on the
writer's intent; (2) the textualist approach which emphasizes the plain meaning; and
(3) the reader approach which embodies creative construction to reach the best policy
result. Id. See also James E. Westbrook, A Comparison of the Interpretation of
Statutes and Collective Bargaining Agreements: Grasping the Pivot of Tao, 60 Mo.
L. REV. 283,285-305 (1995) (providing a comprehensive analysis ofrecent scholarship
on statutory interpretation).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1994) (emphasis added). See also Americans With
19971
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this language, some federal courts have concluded that Title VII's plain
language3 mandates imposing individual liability on an employer's agents
because the statute incorporates "agent" within its definition of "employer."
3 2
Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (1994); Age Discrimination in
Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1994) (both the ADA andtheADEA
apply the same definition of "employer" as Title VII).
Courts commonly refer to these statutes as the "anti-discrimination statutes" and
interchangeably apply their accompanying case law in interpreting these statutory
provisions unless the context mandates to the contrary. See, e.g., Newman v. GHS
Osteopathic, Inc., 60 F.3d 153, 157 (3d Cir. 1995); EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigations,
Ltd., 55 F.3d 1276, 1279 (7th Cir. 1995); DeLuca v. Winer Indus., Inc., 53 F.3d 793,
797 (7th Cir. 1995); Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l Corp., 991 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir.
1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1109 (1994).
31. Courts predominantly consider the "Plain Language" approach as the initial
starting point to statutory interpretation. See, e.g., Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S.
224, 231 (1993); United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989);
Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 685 (1985); In re Sanderfoot, 899
F.2d 598, 600 (7th Cir. 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 500 U.S. 291 (1991); and
Jendusa v. Cancer Treatment Ctrs. of America, Inc., 868 F. Supp. 1006, 1010 (N.D.
II1. 1994). See also POPKIN, supra note 29, §§ 8.03, 9.02 (discussing the "plain
meaning" approach to statutory interpretation as, when language has a core plain
meaning, "it is usually because the facts in a case satisfy all plausible conditions. Plain
meaning is really the plain application of a text to the facts at hand."); NORMAN J.
SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.01 (5th ed. 1992)
(discussing the importance of the text in statutory construction).
32. See, e.g., Ball v. Renner, 54 F.3d 664, 667 (10th Cir. 1995) (noting that the
agent must be the equivalent of an employer by exercising "supervisory/managerial
authority" over the employees); Pierce v. Commonwealth Life Ins. Co., 40 F.3d 796,
802 (6th Cir. 1994) (same); Sauers v. Salt Lake County, 1 F.3d 1122, 1125 (10th Cir.
1993) (concluding that to qualify as an employer, the individual agent must serve in
a supervisory position and exercise significant control over the plaintiff's hiring, firing,
or other employment conditions); Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 404 (7th Cir.
1990) (noting in dicta, based on the ADEA's text, that the plaintiff might have a cause
of action solely against the agent); Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 104 (4th
Cir. 1989), rev'd in part, affd in relevantpart, 900 F.2d 27 (4th Cir. 1990) (en bane);
York v. Tennessee Crushed Stone Ass'n, 684 F.2d 360, 362 (6th Cir. 1982) (noting
in dicta that "an agent of an employer who may be sued as an employer in Title VII
suits has been construed to be a supervisory or managerial employee to whom
employment decisions have been delegated by the employer"); Goodstein v.
Bombardier Capital, Inc., 889 F. Supp. 760, 764-65 (D. Vt. 1995); Jendusa v. Cancer
Treatment Ctrs. of America, Inc., 868 F. Supp. 1006, 1010 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (finding
that Title VII's plain language supports that agents are included within the definition
of employer and, thus, subjecting the agent to individual liability); House v. Cannon
Mills Co., 713 F. Supp. 159, 161-62 (M.D.N.C. 1988) (applying a plain language
approach under the ADEA); Goodman v. Board of Trustees of Community College
[Vol. 62
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On the other hand, a minority of courts have found that this same language
prohibited a finding of agent liability.3
In addition, the federal courts have considered the legislature's purpose
(the goals Congress seeks to promote) in enacting Title VII and its 1991
amendments as a guide for interpreting whether the statute imposes individual
liability. These courts focus on Title VII's language, making it a violation for
an "employer" to discriminate.34 The Supreme Court has characterized
Congress's purpose in enacting this legislation as serving two primary goals:
fully compensating victims of discrimination and deterring discriminatory
employment practices.35 Moreover, courts have found that Title VII, as
remedial legislation, must be construed liberally.36
Dist. 524, 498 F. Supp. 1329, 1332 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (imposing agent liability based on
the Title VII's plain language).
33. See, e.g., Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 771-72 (1lth Cir. 1991)
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1994) (definition of "employer"); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2
(1994) (violation for "employer" to discriminate); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1994)
(relief for violation of § 2000e-2); Padway v. Palches, 665 F.2d 965, 968 (9th Cir.
1982) (stating that Title VII's language addresses employer conduct as opposed to an
agent's conduct); Clanton v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 649 F.2d 1084, 1099, 1099 n.19
(5th Cir. 1981).
However, courts have rejected these cases' reasoning. See, e.g., Barger v.
Kansas, 630 F. Supp. 88, 91 (D. Kan. 1985) (noting that the Padway court's reasoning
was "clearly erroneous"); Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir.
1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1109 (1994) (although the court ultimately rejects agent
liability, the court indicates that concluding that Title VII's plain language permits
agent liability is not "without merit").
34. See, e.g., Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1313 (2d Cir. 1995) ("[I]n
expounding a statute, we must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a
sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy.").
See also Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 51 (1987); Griffin v. Oceanic
Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982) (A statute's plain meaning normally
controls "except in the rare cases [where] the literal application of a statute will
produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters.").
35. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975). See also
Jendusa v. Cancer Treatment Ctrs. of America, Inc., 868 F. Supp. 1006, 1010 (N.D.
Ill. 1994) (citing this same proposition).
36. Jendusa, 868 F. Supp. at 1010 (citing Philbin v. General Elec. Capital Auto
Lease, Inc., 929 F.2d 321, 323 (7th Cir. 1991)); Taylor v. Western & Southern Life
Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 1188, 1195 (7th Cir. 1992); EEOC v. Liberty Trucking Co., 695
F.2d 1038, 1040 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1204 (1984) ("Federal courts
have consistently interpreted Title VII in a manner which places great weight on the
important remedial purposes of the legislation."); Armbruster v. Quinn, 711 F.2d 1332,
1336 (6th Cir. 1983) ("To effectuate its purpose of eradicating the evils of employment
discrimination, Title VII should be given a liberal construction. The impact of this
1997]
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To accomplish Title VII's full deterrent effect, some courts have
concluded that Congress intended to impose individual liability because
otherwise an employer's agents might believe that they could violate Title VII
with impunity.37 However, other courts have found that individual liability is
unnecessary to accomplish Title VII's deterrent function. These courts
observe that the marketplace would adequately ensure that employers, as
rational economic actors, would avoid the risk of a civil penalty by educating
or disciplining their employees.38
However, in response to the argument that the marketplace will indirectly
accomplish Title VII's deterrent goal, other courts have noted that
discriminatory employment practices-such as failure to promote the most
qualified candidate on account of race, age, gender or other prohibited
factor-do not represent rational economic conduct. Therefore, "it is
inconceivable.., that Congress intended to delegate the deterrence function
of these statutes to the rational economic actors in the marketplace." '39
Another attack on the marketplace as a deterrent questions the empirical
assumption that employers discipline agents that have violated an anti-
discrimination statute.40
Some courts have concluded that Congress inserted the "agent" language
into the "employer" definition with the purpose of incorporating respondeat
superior liability4' into the statute.42 On the other hand, courts that reject this
construction is the broad interpretation given to the employer and employee
provisions.").
37. Jendusa, 868 F. Supp. at 1109 (citing Strzelecki v. Schwarz Paper Co., 824
F. Supp. 821, 829 (N.D. III. 1993) (not allowing individual liability undermines the
ADEA's deterrent goal); Vakharia v. Swedish Covenant Hosp., 824 F. Supp. 769, 785
(N.D. I11. 1993)). See also Hamilton v. Rodgers, 791 F.2d 439, 443 (5th Cir. 1986).
38. Jendusa, 868 F. Supp. at 1010 (citing Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l Inc., 991 F.2d
583, 588 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1109 (1994) ("No employer will allow
supervisory or other personnel to violate Title VII when the employer is liable for the
Title VII violation. An employer that has incurred civil damages because one of its
employees believes he can violate Title VII with impunity will quickly correct that
employee's erroneous belief.")). See also EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 55
F.3d 1276, 1282 (7th Cir. 1995) (the employer has proper incentives for disciplining
offending employees to deter future illegal acts); Lenhardt v. Basic Inst. of Tech., Inc.,
55 F.3d 377, 380 (8th Cir. 1995) (decided under the Missouri Human Rights Act
("MHRA") based on the analogous federal civil rights laws and cases).
39. Jendusa, 868 F. Supp. at 1011.
40. For example, one court reasons that employers may feel that their employment
decisions were motivated by legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons, despite the jury's
contrary verdict, and, thus, choose not to discipline the responsible employee.
Jendusa, 868 F. Supp. at 1012.
41. Respondeat superior liability is a form of vicarious liability that allows
(Vol. 62
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argument state that no legislative history, either in committee reports or floor
debates, regarding Title VII's definition of "employer" supports this view."3
These courts maintain that, if Congress had intended to impose respondeat
superior liability, Congress could have included a direct statement to this
effect in the statute as opposed to merely including "agents" within the
definition of "employer.""
The Supreme Court in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson45 instructed that
"Congress wanted courts to look to agency principles for guidance" when
determining employer liability for its agents under Title VII." As such, some
courts have applied agency law47 to find personal liability for agents under
Title VII."
employers to be strictly liable for their agent's torts under certain circumstances. See
W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 69 (5th
ed. 1984); and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1958).
42. AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d at 1281 (decided in ADEA context);
Lenhardt, 55 F.3d at 380 (decided under the MHRA); Smith v. Lomax, 45 F.3d 402,
403 n.4 (1 th Cir. 1995) (decided under the ADEA); Miller, 991 F.2d at 587; Birkbeck
v. Marvel Lighting Corp., 30 F.3d 507, 511 n.1 (4th Cir. 1994) (noting, however, that
the court was only denying individual liability for personnel decisions of a "plainly
delegable character" and, therefore, did not consider the context of sexual harassment);
Grant v. Lone Star Co., 21 F.3d 649, 652 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 574,
(1994); Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 772 (1 1th Cir. 1991).
43. Jendusa, 868 F. Supp. at 1012. See also 110 CONG. REC. 130 (1964).
44. Id. (citing Cassanov. DeSoto, Inc., 860 F. Supp. 537, 539 (N.D. I11. 1994)).
45. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
46. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72. However, the Supreme Court does not cite to any
legislative history to support this proposition.
47. The Restatement (Second) of Agency stipulates that "[p]rincipal and agent can
be joined in one action for a wrong resulting from the tortious conduct of an agent
... and a judgment can issue against each." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§ 359c(1) (1957).
48. See, e.g., Garcia v. Elf Atochem North America, 28 F.3d 446,450-51 and n.2
(5th Cir. 1994) (construing plaintiff's complaint to state a cause of action against his
supervisors in their official capacities because "Title VII liability does not attach to
individuals acting in their individual capacity"); Harvey v. Blake, 913 F.2d 226, 227-
28 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that individuals acting as an employer's agents are liable
in their official capacities only); Padway v. Palches, 665 F.2d 965, 968 (9th Cir. 1982)
(same); Jendusa, 868 F. Supp. at 1013-14; Griffith v. Keystone Steel & Wire Co., 858
F. Supp. 802, 806 (C.D. IIl. 1994).
However, other courts conclude that Congress included the agent clause within
the definition of employer in order for agency principles to determine the scope of an
employer's liability as opposed to imposing joint and several Title VII liability upon
an agent. As a result, the agent clause still would not be mere surplusage. See, e.g.,
Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1315 (2d Cir. 1995).
19971
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Moreover, in Meritor, the Supreme Court found congressional intent to
limit an employer's responsibility for an agent's acts when the employer
would not be liable under agency principles." Consequently, if a court found
an employer not liable for his agent's Title VII violation and the court did not
recognize individual liability under the Act, then the victim of discrimination
would not have a remedy under Title VII.5" As such, Title VII would provide
no deterrent effect on the agent in this situation."'
One court indicates that such a result "is wholly incompatible with the
remedial and deterrence objectives of Title VII and the other anti-
discrimination statutes . . . [and concludes] that the statutes must be
interpreted to authorize individual liability."52 Courts have also made a similar
argument when the employer, although liable for her agent's discriminatory
acts, is judgment proof, precluding the victim from obtaining any significant
remedy from her. As a result, permitting individual liability against the agent
might provide the victim with the only avenue for real recovery under Title
VII. 3 However, some plaintiffs have also sought redress by bringing a tort
cause of action for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress54 ("IIED").5
49. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72 ("Congress' decision to define 'employer' to include
any 'agent' of an employer, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), surely evinces an intent to place
some limits on the acts of employees for which employers under Title VII are to be
held responsible."). Nonetheless, the Supreme Court does not cite any legislative
history to support this proposition but, instead, bases this conclusion upon the statutory
definition of employer as "surely" evidencing such intent. See infra notes 113-116 and
accompanying text for further discussion of Meritor's applicability to the present case.
50. Jendusa, 868 F. Supp. at 1013.
51. Id.
52. Id, at 1013 n.9.
53. Id, at 1011 n.7 (citing Vakharia, 824 F. Supp. at 785-86; Zakutansky v.
Bionetics Corp., 806 F. Supp. 1362, 1365 n.7 (N.D. III. 1992)).
54. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965) defines "Outrageous Conduct
Causing Severe Emotional Distress" as follows:
(1) One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly
causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such
emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such
bodily harm.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d defines "extreme and outrageous
conduct" as:
It has not been enough that the defendant has acted with an intent which is
tortious or even criminal, or that he has intended to inflict emotional
distress, or even that his conduct has been characterized by "malice," or a
degree of aggravation which would entitle the plaintiff to punitive damages
for another tort. Liability has been found only where the conduct has been
so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all
possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly
[Vol. 62
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Courts that have denied individual liability under Title VII have pointed
to the Act's definition of "employer" that extends liability only to employer's
with fifteen or more employees.5 6 These courts reason that Congress so
limited employer liability in order to avoid burdening small entities with
litigation costs associated with discrimination claims; therefore, Congress
could not have intended to impose such a burden against an individual
employee.
However, other courts that have imposed individual liability have rejected
this argument for several reasons." First, some courts noted that Congress
limited the definition of "employer" not only out of a concern for litigation
costs but also to limit the federal government's reach into small employers'
associational rights. 9 Second, these courts indicated that Congress limited the
intolerable in a civilized community. Generally, the case is one in which
the recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would
arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim,
"Outrageous!" The liability clearly does not extend to mere insults,
indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppression, or other trivialities ....
(emphasis added).
55. See, e.g., Ball v. Renner, 54 F.3d 664, 664 (10th Cir. 1995); Pierce v.
Commonwealth Life Ins. Co., 40 F.3d 796, 799 (6th Cir. 1994); Brooms v. Regal Tube
Co., 881 F.2d 412, 416 (7th Cir. 1989); Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100 (4th
Cir. 1989), rev'd in part, aff'd in relevantpart, 900 F.2d 27 (4th Cir. 1990) (en bane).
However, in order to recover under an IIED theory, the plaintiff must show that
the discriminatory act was significantly more severe than what otherwise would qualify
as sexual harassment under Title VII. See, e.g., supra note 9 and accompanying text
referring to the Supreme Court's test for a sexual harassment cause of action.
56. Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1313-14 (2d Cir. 1995); EEOC v. AIC
Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1276, 1281 (7th Cir. 1995); Birbeck v. Marvel
Lighting Corp., 30 F.3d 507, 510 (4th Cir. 1994); Grant v. Lone Star Co., 21 F.3d
649, 652 (5th Cir. 1994); Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir.
1993); Pelech v. Klaff-Joss, LP, 828 F. Supp. 525, 529 (N.D. Ill. 1993); Finley v.
Rodman & Renshaw, Inc., 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 916, 917 (N.D. III. 1993).
57. 1d. See Remarks of Senator Cotton, 110 CONG. REC. 13092 (1964) (reflecting
a concern for small business' ability to absorb the litigation costs of a discrimination
claim; Remarks of Senator Morse, 110 CONG. REc. 13092-93 (1964) (same); Remarks
of Senator Humphrey, 110 CONG. REC. 13088 (1964); See also Remarks of Senator
Stennis, 118 CONG. REc. 2388-89 (1972) (noting similar concerns when Congress was
considering expanding the definition of employer).
58. Jendusav. Cancer Treatment Ctrs. of America, Inc., 868 F. Supp. 1006, 1014
(N.D. Ill. 1994). See also Lamirande v. RTC, 834 F. Supp. 526, 528-29 (D.N.H.
1993).
59. Jendusa, 868 F. Supp. at 1013. See Remarks of Senator Cotton, 110 CONG.
REC. 13085-86 (1964) ("[T]he principal reason why title VII is so repugnant.., lies
in the fact that in a small business... the personal relationship is predominant ....
1997]
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definition of "employer" to eliminate the administrative burden on small
businesses of complying with the federal government's bureaucratic
regulations and accompanying paperwork.' As such, these courts conclude
that Congress' desire to protect small employers from Title VII liability does
not necessarily require an inference that Congress similarly desired to protect
an individual agent that otherwise qualifies as an "employer" under the Act.6'
Before the 1991 amendments to Title 'VII, 62 some courts believed that
Congress did not seek to impose individual liability because Title VII's
remedial scheme consisted of equitable remedies63 that an employer, as
opposed to an agent, would most likely provide.' However, since the 1991
amendments6" have added compensatory as well as punitive damages to the
potential remedies, other courts have noted that this argument loses all its
force.'
Nonetheless, some courts maintain that the 1991 amendments further
evidence legislative intent to not impose individual liability on an employer's
When a small businessman ... selects an employee, he comes very close to selecting
a partner; and when a businessman selects a partner, he comes dangerously close to
the situation he faces when he selects a wife."). See also Remarks of Senator Ervin,
118 CONG. REC. 3171 (1972); Remarks of Senator Fannin, 118 CONG. REC. 2411
(1972) (reflecting the same concern). See also Janice R. Franke, Does Title VII
Contemplate Personal Liability for Employee/Agent Defendants?, 12 HOFSTRA LAB.
L.J. 39 (1994).
60. Id. See Remarks of Senator Fannin, 118 CONG. REC. 2410 (1972) ("Men and
women who are very able and eager to run small businesses find that they are
overwhelmed by paperwork and regulations and redtape.").
61. Jendusa, 868 F. Supp. at 1014. See also Lamirande, 834 F. Supp. at 528-29.
62. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102, 105 Stat. 1071, 1072-
73 (1991).
63. These remedies included back pay, reinstatement, and an injunction against
future discriminatory practices. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1994).
64. Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1314; AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d at 1281;
Grant, 21 F.3d at 653; Padway, 665 F.2d at 968; Pommier v. James L. Edelstein
Enters., 816 F. Supp. 476, 481 (N.D. 111. 1993) (indicating that individual liability is
not needed because the employer can generally provide the victim of discrimination
with the full available remedy); Weiss v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 772 F. Supp. 407,
411 (N.D. IIl. 1991) (same).
65. See supra note 62.
66. Jendusa, 868 F. Supp. at 1015 (citing Vakharia v. Swedish Covenant Hosp.,
824 F. Supp. 769, 785 n.2 (N.D. Ill. 1993) and Hangebrauck v. Deloitte & Touche,
No. 92-C-3328, 1992 WL 348743, at *3 (N.D. II1. Nov. 9, 1992)).
However, an amendment to the remedial scheme cannot change the legislative
intent that arguably existed when the original Act was adopted. See, e.g., POPKIN,
supra note 29, § 15.01 (discussing impact of later legislation).
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agents for the following reason.' In the 1991 amendments, Congress
specifically limited the potential damages based upon an employer's size but
did not list a corresponding limit for agents.68 Some courts find that this
omission reveals that Congress did not contemplate individual liability under
Title VII.69
One court has responded to this argument by contending that the 1991
damage scheme merely sets a cap on the compensatory and punitive damages
that a discrimination victim can recover and makes this cap a function of the
employer's number of employees." In addition, some courts have found that
the 1991 amendments' legislative history supports the view that Congress did
not intend to omit individual liability under Title VII. 7' Such courts cite
congressional findings that the pre-1991 remedies were inadequate and that the
1991 amendments' express purpose was "to strengthen existing remedies to
provide more effective deterrence and ensure compensation commensurate
with the harms suffered by victims of intentional discrimination."72 Therefore,
these courts conclude that Congress' silence on agent liability under the 1991
damage scheme is irrelevant because no express provision was needed to
67. Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1314; AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d at 1281;
Miller, 991 F.2d at 587-88 n.2. See also Grant, 21 F.3d at 651-53; Finley v. Rodman
& Renshaw, 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 916, 917 (N.D. Ili. 1993).
68. Id. See also 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (Supp. 1993). This damage limitation
provision authorizes compensatory and punitive damage awards only in the disparate
treatment cases as opposed to disparate impact cases. These provisions state:
The sum of the amount of compensatory damages awarded under this
section ... and the amount of punitive damages awarded under this section,
shall not exceed, for each complaining party-
(A) in the case of a respondent who has more than 14 and fewer than
101 employees .... $50,000;
(B) in the case of a respondent who has more than 100 and fewer than
201 employees .... $100,000; and
(C) in the case of a respondent who has more than 200 and fewer than
501 employees .... $200,000; and
(D) in the case of a respondent who has more than 500
employees ... , $300,000.
42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (Supp. 1993).
69. Id.
70. Jendusa, 868 F. Supp. at 1016.
71. Id See H.R. REP. No. 102-40(I), at 18, 113 (1991). See also Sheehan v.
Purolator Courier Corp., 676 F.2d 877, 885, 887 (2d Cir. 1982); Guardians Ass'n of
New York City Police Dept., Inc. v. Civil Service Comm'n of City of New York, 633
F.2d 232, 254 (2d Cir. 1980).
72. Id (citing H.R. REP. No. 102-40(I), at 18, 113 (1991)).
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effectuatethe broad compensatory and deterrent purposes envisioned under the
Act."
B. The Current Conflict Among the Circuits Regarding
Individual Liability Under Title VII
The courts of appeals in the various circuits, analyzing the preceding
arguments, have reached divergent results. Thus, there is a conflict among the
circuits regarding individual liability under Title VII.
74
The four circuits explicitly rejecting individual liability under Title VII
include the Second,75 Fourth,76 Ninth," and Eleventh78 Circuits. The two
73. Id.
74. See infra notes 95-102 and accompanying text for the Seventh Circuit's
summary of this conflict's current status.
75. The Second Circuit recently rejected individual liability under Title VII.
Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1314 (2nd Cir. 1995).
This case decided the Second Circuit's split on the issue as reflected in the
following district court cases: Bakal v. Ambassador Constr., 94 Civ. 584, 1995 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 10542, at *8-12 (S.D.N.Y. July 28, 1995) (finding no agent liability);
Coraggio v. Time, Inc., 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1880, 1886 (S.D.N.Y. April
26, 1995) (same); Goodstein v. Bombardier Capital, Inc., 889 F. Supp. 760, 763-65
(D.Vt. 1995) (imposing agent liability); Dirschel v. Speck, 94 Civ. 0502, 1994 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 9257, at *20-24 (S.D.N.Y. July 6, 1994) (same); Bridges v. Eastman
Kodak Co., 800 F. Supp. 1172, 1179-80 (S.D.N.Y 1992) (same).
Nonetheless, the Second Circuit did allow the agent to be sued in his personal
capacity for sexual harassment under New York's Human Rights Law. Id. (citing
N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 292(5) (McKinney 1993)).
The New York Human Rights Law ("HRL") defines "employer" as a function of
the number of employees and is also silent on the issue of individual liability. N.Y.
ExEC. LAW § 292(5) (McKinney 1993). See also Patrowich v. Chemical Bank, 473
N.E.2d 11, 12 (1984) (stating this proposition).
Section 296(6) of the HRL makes it an unlawful discriminatory practice "for any
person to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden
under this article, or attempt to do so." N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 292(6) (McKinney 1993).
As such, some courts have found that a defendant that actually participates in the
discriminatory conduct can be subject to personal liability under the HRL. See, e.g.,
Poulsen v. City of North Tonawanda, 811 F. Supp. 884, 900 (W.D.N.Y. 1993);
Bridges, 800 F. Supp. at 1180-81; Wanamaker v. Columbian Rope Co., 740 F. Supp.
127, 135-36 (N.D.N.Y. 1990). Cf Patrowich, 473 N.E.2d at 12.
76. The Fourth Circuit rejected individual liability under the ADEA. Birkbeck
v. Marvel Lighting Corp., 30 F.3d 507, 510 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
666 (1994). However, the Fourth Circuit noted in dictum that an employee might be
liable if not performing plainly delegable tasks. Id at 511 n.1.
77. The Ninth Circuit recently rejected individual liability in Greenlawv. Garrett,
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circuits that have sent conflicting messages on this issue are the Fifth 79 and
Tenth8 0 Circuits. On the other hand, the Sixth Circuit, in dicta, has recognized
individual liability under Title VIL
As such, two circuits, the Seventh and the Eighth,82 had not formally
ruled on individual liability under Title VII. The Seventh Circuit was finally
presented this opportunity in Williams v. Banning.83
59 F.3d 994, 1001 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 110 (1996).
78. The Eleventh Circuit rejected individual liability in Cross v. Alabama State
Dep't of Mental Health and Mental Retardation, 49 F.3d 1490, 1504 (1 1th Cir. 1995).
79. Although the Fifth Circuit rejected individual liability in Grant v. Lone Star
Co., 21 F.3d 649, 649 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 574 (1994), the court
has most recently held "supervisors who exercise employer's traditional rights ...
liable under Title VII." Garcia v. Elf Atochem North America, 28 F.3d 446, 451 (5th
Cir. 1994).
80. The Tenth Circuit has most recently approved individual liability in theory
while still formally considering the issue an open question. Ball v. Renner, 54 F.3d
664, 668 (10th Cir. 1995). However, the court had previously rejected individual
liability. Sauers v. Salt Lake County, 1 F.3d 1122, 1125 (10th Cir. 1993).
81. York v. Tennessee Crushed Stone Ass'n., 684 F.2d 360, 362 (6th Cir. 1982).
82. However, the Eighth Circuit did reject individual liability under a similarly
worded state statute by analogy to Title VII. Lenhardt v. Basic Inst. of Tech. Inc., 55
F.3d 377, 380-81 (8th Cir. 1995) (construing the Missouri Human Rights Act
("MHRA")). See also Smith v. St. Bernard's Regional Medical Center, 19 F.3d 1254,
1255 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that claims against individual defendants fail under Title
VII in context of co-employee as opposed to supervisor); Herrero v. St. Louis Univ.
Hosp., 929 F. Supp. 1260, 1266 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (supervisors are not individually
liable under Title VII, the ADEA, or the MHRA as they are not the employer to whom
those statutes are directed); Griswold v. Madrid County Group Practice, 920 F. Supp.
1046, 1046-1048 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (same); Schallehn v. Central Trust and Say. Bank,
877 F. Supp. 1315, 1328-1338 (N.D. Iowa 1995) (holding individual liability can be
imposed on supervisory personnel under ADEA); Seals v. State of Missouri, Div. of
Youth Servs., 865 F. Supp. 595, 595-596 (E.D. Mo. 1994) (rejecting individual
liability under Title VII and MHRA); Williams v. Rothman Furniture Stores, Inc., 862
F. Supp. 239, 240-41 (E.D. Mo. 1994) (rejecting individual liability under Title VII);
Engle v. Barton County Memorial Hosp., 864 F. Supp. 118, 118-120 (W.D. Mo. 1994)
(holding hospital administration is not subject to individual liability under Title VII);
Henry v. E.G.&G. Missouri Metals Shipping Co., 837 F. Supp. 312, 314 (E.D. Mo.
1993 (no individual liability for supervisory employees per Title VII); Stafford v. State
of Missouri, 835 F. Supp. 1136, 1148-49 (W.D. Mo. 1993) (rejecting Title VII and
MHRA claims against supervisor in individual capacity); Burrell v. Truman Med. Ctr.,
Inc., 721 F. Supp. 230, 231-32 (W.D. Mo. 1989) (holding that employees may be
liable under federal Civil Rights Act if they qualify as statutory agents of employer).
83. Williams v. Banning, 72 F.3d 552 (7th Cir. 1995).
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IV. INSTANT DECISION
In considering Williams's appeal, the Seventh Circuit accepted as true the
facts alleged in Williams's complaint.84
The court first noted that both sides agreed that Title VII and its 1991
amendments do not specifically address the issue of individual liability.8" The
court then examined the Congressional purpose behind Title VII and,
particularly, its 1991 amendments. The court stated that one of the major
reasons Congress adopted the 1991 amendments was to allow punitive and
compensatory damages for the victims of unlawful intentional discrimination,
provided that they could not otherwise recover under section 1981 of the
Act.86 Nonetheless, the Seventh Circuit found that the 1991 amendments to
Title VII limited damages based on the employer's size"7 and that this limit
reflected a congressional intent not to impose individual liability on an
employer's agents.88
Next, the court stated that it had recently denied individual liability under
the Americans With Disabilities Act ("ADA").8 9 Because Title VII, the ADA,
and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") contain essentially
the same definition of "employer,"'9 the appellate court drew an analogy
84. Id. at 553 (citing Whirlpool Fin. Corp. v. GN Holdings, Inc., 67 F.3d 605,
608 (7th Cir. 1995)).
85. Id.
86. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (1994)). The Seventh Circuit indicated
that the stated purpose of the 1991 amendments was "to provide appropriate remedies
for intentional discrimination and unlawful harassment in the workplace" and "to
respond to recent decisions of the Supreme Court by expanding the scope of relevant
civil rights statutes in order to provide adequate protection to victims of
discrimination." Id. (quoting Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 3(1), (4), 105 Stat. 1071 (1991)).
87. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102, 105 Stat. 1071, 1072-73 (1991).
88. Banning, 72 F.3d at 553 (citing EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 55
F.3d 1276, 1279-82 (7th Cir. 1995); Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587
(9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1109 (1994) ("If Congress decided to protect
small entities with limited resources from liability, it is inconceivable that Congress
intended to allow civil liability to run against individual employees.")).
89. Id. (citing EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1276, 1279-82 (7th
Cir. 1995)).
90. Title VII defines "employer" as "a person engaged in an industry affecting
commerce who has fifleen or more employees... and any agent of such person[.]"
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1994). The ADA's and the ADEA's corresponding provisions
are located at 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (1994), and 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1994),
respectively.
"Courts routinely apply arguments regarding individual liability to all three
statutes interchangeably." AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d at 1279-80. See also
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from a recent Seventh Circuit case, EEOC v. AIC Security Investigations,
Limited,9 involving individual liability under the ADA.' In that case, the
appellate court held that the ADA's definition of "employer," which (like Title
VII) includes an employer's agents, merely represents traditional respondeat
superior liability as opposed to creating individual liability for the employer's
agents.93 In fact, the court indicated that its holding-rejecting individual
liability under the ADA-was based on cases that had rejected individual
liability under Title VII.94 Next, the Seventh Circuit summarized the other
Circuits' positions on an agent's individual liability under the Act as follows.
The court noted that the Second,95 Fourth, 96 Ninth,97 and Eleventh?
Circuits have all recently rejected individual liability under Title VII. 9
Although the Eighth Circuit has not formally considered individual liability
under Title VII, the court found that the Eighth Circuit did reject individual
liability under a similarly worded state statute."° The court found that the
Fifth and Tenth Circuits presented conflicting signals on individual liability
Newman v. GHS Osteopathic, Inc., Parkview Hosp. Div., 60 F.3d 153, 156-57 (3d Cir.
1995).
91. 55 F.3d 1276, 1279-82 (7th Cir. 1995).
92. Banning, 72 F.3d at 554.
93. Id. For a discussion of respondeat superior liability, see supra notes 41-44.
94. Id. (citing AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d at 1280 (citing Smith v.
Lomax, 45 F.3d 402 (11th Cir. 1995); Grant v. Lone Star Co., 21 F.3d 649 (5th Cir.
1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 574 (1994); Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d
583, 587 (9th Cir. 1993))).
95. Id. at 554 n.2 (citing Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1313-17 (2d Cir.
1995)). See supra note 75 discussing the Second Circuit case law on the issue.
96. Id. (citing Birkbeck v. Marvel Lighting Corp., 30 F.3d 507, 510 n.1 (4th Cir.
1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 666 (1994)) (rejecting individual liability under the
ADEA, while noting in dictum that an employee "may not be shielded as an
employer's agent" unless performing plainly delegable tasks).
97. Id. (citing Greenlaw v. Garrett, 59 F.3d 994, 1001 (9th Cir. 1995), cert.
denied, 117 S. Ct. 110 (1996)).
98. Id. (citing Cross v. Alabama, 49 F.3d 1490, 1504 (11th Cir. 1995)).
99. Id.
100. Id. (citing Lenhardt v. Basic Inst. of Tech., Inc., 55 F.3d 377, 380-81 (8th
Cir. 1995)) (construing the Missouri Human Rights Act by analogy to Title VII).
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under the Act.'' However, the Seventh Circuit stated that the Sixth Circuit
had recognized, in dictum, individual liability under Title VII.'
In reaching its decision, the Seventh Circuit indicated that the rationale
underlying AIC Security mandated the instant case's disposition unless Title
VII's definition of "employer" is meaningfully distinguishable from the
ADA's. °3 In concluding that the two definitions of "employer" were not
meaningfully distinguishable, and, therefore, both statutory definitions of
"employer" were ambiguous, the court rejected Williams's textual
argument.'04 The court refused to accept that Title VII's plain language
includes an employer's agents within the definition of "employer" and,
therefore, imposes individual liability on the agent."0 5 The appellate court
noted that it had similarly rejected this "plain language" argument in AIC
Security."° In addition, the court found that the majority of appellate courts
directly considering the issue had similarly rejected the "plain language"
argument."0 7 The court further indicated that it had previously characterized
the definition of "employer" as ambiguous regarding the issue of individual
agent liability and, thus, susceptible of several potential interpretations.'
Next, the appellate court addressed Williams's argument based on Title
VII's broad remedial purpose. Williams contended that the 1991 Amendments
to the Civil Rights Act that added both punitive and compensatory damages
reflected a broad remedial purpose to provide redress for victims of
101. Id. (comparing Grant v. Lone Star, 21 F.3d 649, 649 (5th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 574 (1994); Sauers v. Salt Lake County, 1 F.3d 1122, 1124-25
(10th Cir. 1993) (both rejecting individual liability) with Ball v. Renner, 54 F.3d 664,
668 (10th Cir. 1995) ("individual liability approved in theory, but considered an 'open
question"); Garcia v. Elf Atochem North America, 28 F.3d 446, 451 (5th Cir. 1994)
("supervisors who exercise employer's traditional rights are liable under Title VII)).
102. Id. (citing York v. Tennessee Crushed Stone Ass'n, 684 F.2d 360, 362 (6th
Cir. 1982)).
103. Id.
104. Williams cited Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Company, 505 U.S. 469,
475 (1992) for the proposition that "[w]hen a statute speaks with clarity to an issue
judicial inquiry into the statute's meaning ... is finished." Id,
105. Id
106. Id. at 3 (citing EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1276, 1281
(7th Cir. 1995)).
107. Id. (citing Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1314 (2d Cir. 1995); Grant
v. Lone Star Co., 21 F.3d 649, 653 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 574
(1994); Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1993) but
comparing Ball v. Renner, 54 F.3d 664, 667 (10th Cir. 1995)).
108. Id. (citing Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398,404 (7th Cir. 1990) (decided
in the context of the ADEA)).
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discrimination and harassment." 9 Williams argued that Congress intended to
impose individual liability on an employer's agents because, otherwise, victims
like Williams (whose employer is not liable for the agent's discriminatory acts
or harassment) would have no remedy."'
In response, the court acknowledged that most cases that had rejected
individual liability assumed, under the doctrine of respondeat superior, that
the victim could sue her employer as another avenue for redress."' The court
noted that Williams did not have this option in the present case because her
employer ("CCC") was not liable for her supervisor's acts of harassment."'
The appellate court explained that employers are not strictly liable for
their agents discriminatory acts under Title VII based on the Supreme Court's
holding in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson."3 Instead, under Meritor, the
court stated that an employer is only liable for a supervisory employee's
sexual harassment if "the supervisor's acts fell within the scope of his
authority or were foreseeable, and the employer failed to take appropriate
remedial action."' '
4
In the instant case, the court concluded that Williams's employer had
already provided the required remedial action."' As such, the court held that
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. (citing AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d at 1282 (holding the
employing entity liable) and Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 772 (11th Cir.
1991) (finding that the plaintiff's appropriate avenue for recovery under Title VII is
through a suit against the employer)).
The Seventh Circuit also noted that Paroline v. Unisys Corporation, 879 F.2d
100, vacated in part, 900 F.2d 27 (4th Cir. 1990) (en banc), did not hold differently.
Id. at 554 n.3. In Paroline, the Fourth Circuit held that: "[a]n individual qualifies as
an 'employer' under Title VII if he or she serves in a supervisory position and
exercises significant control over the plaintiff's hiring, firing or conditions of
employment." Id. (quoting Paroline, 879 F.2d at 104). The Seventh Circuit explained
that the court in that case determined whether the individual harasser met the definition
of "employer" in order to decide whether the employer would be liable for the
harassment under a respondeat superior theory. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id (citing Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986)).
114. Id. The court cited Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 404 (7th Cir.
1990), Garcia v. ElfAtochem North America, 28 F.3d 446, 451 (5th Cir. 1994), and
Pierce v. Commonwealth Life Ins. Co., 40 F.3d 796, 803 (6th Cir. 1994) as examples
of appellate courts applying this Meritor standard. To contrast, the court cited
Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d 773, 780 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
2693 (1994), as holding that an employer is "absolutely liable if supervisor uses actual
or apparent authority to further harassment." Id.
115. Id. The court found that CCC maintained a system where harassment victims
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Title VII need not provide any remedy other than this respondeat superior
liability to a victim like Williams." 6 The court found that Williams had
already received a significant non-monetary remedy because her employer
showed sensitivity to her complaint by taking prompt action against her
harasser." 7 For example, the court noted that Williams remains employed
with her company while her supervisor Banning does not."8 Therefore, the
court stated that such a prompt remedy would also likely deter other potential
harassers from violating Title VII." 9
However, the appellate court commented that, if an employer's prompt
remedial action does not fully compensate a victim of severe harassment,
then Congress instead intended for the victim to rely on traditional tort
remedies for redress.' The court explained that such a conclusion follows
their analysis in AIC Security." In that case, the plaintiff argued that since
the employer was judgment-proof because of bankruptcy, the plaintiff could
only recover if the court imposed individual liability." In rejecting the
plaintiffs argument, the Seventh Circuit stated that Congress and not the
courts had the power to amend this statutory structure. 24 Applying this
rationale to the instant case, the court found that this distinction (merely
because the employer in this case was not liable as opposed to judgment
proof) did not raise sufficient grounds for imposing individual liability. 25
In conclusion, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal
of Williams's Title VII claim against her supervisor in his individual capacity
could relate their complaints to the company. After Williams used the company's
complaint system, CCC promptly investigated her complaint and then took quick,
decisive action against her supervisor Banning. Id.
116. Id. The Seventh Circuit clarified that Meritor and its progeny "do not hold
that an agent's acts of harassment are not attributable to a principal who takes prompt
remedial action, just that the principal/employer is not liable for such acts." Id. (citing
Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72; Brooms v. Regal Tube Co., 881 F.2d 412, 421 (7th Cir.
1989)). As such, Banning's acts of harassment are attributable to his employer;




120. The court listed examples of "severe" harassment to include severe mental
and emotional distress, embarrassment, and humiliation. Id. at 555.
121. Id. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text for a discussion regarding
the traditional tort recovery of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress.
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under Rule 12(b)(6).'26 The court held that Williams failed to state a claim
on which relief could be granted because "a supervisor does not, in his
individual capacity, fall within Title VII's definition of employer." 27
IV. COMMENT
In rejecting individual liability under Title VII, the Seventh Circuit
becomes the next to the last circuit to address the issue.'28 Only the Eighth
Circuit awaits formal consideration of this question.' 29 The Seventh Circuit
followed the majority of the circuits that have refused to impose personal




The various circuits' analysis of this statutory interpretation question
reveals debates regarding the meaning of the statute as well as the proper
approach to statutory interpretation.'32  Significantly, these various
approaches result in divergent policy implications for potential Title VII
plaintiffs and defendants.
The courts following a strict "plain meaning" approach to statutory
interpretation conclude that Title VII does impose individual liability upon an
employer's agents because "agent" is expressly included within the statutory
definition of an "employer."'3'  Therefore, an agent meets Title VII's
statutory definition of employer and is consequently subject to Title VII
liability.
Such a result furthers the legislative purpose behind Title VII of
providing compensation to victims of unlawful discrimination and deterring
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 552.
129. See Lenhardt v. Basic Inst. of Tech., Inc., 55 F.3d 377 (8th Cir. 1995)
(rejecting individual liability under the Missouri Human Rights Act).
130. For a discussion of the circuits that have refused to impose individual
liability under Title VII, see supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
131. For a discussion of the circuits that have imposed individual liability under
Title VII, see supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text
132. For a discussion regarding the circuits' various approaches to interpreting
Title VII, see supra notes 29-73 and accompanying text.
133. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text that discusses the "plain
meaning" approach to statutory interpretation and the courts that have adhered to this
method. See also Scott B. Goldberg, Comment, Discrimination by Managers and
Supervisors: Recognizing Agent Liability Under Title VII, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 571,
575 (1994) (arguing that Title VII's literal text supports a finding of agent liability).
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Title VII violations. 34  For instance, one scholar argues that imposing
individual liability upon an agent provides a direct deterrent to the agent
through the threat of personal bankruptcy as well as serving as a better
approach to allocating the blame on the party responsible for the unlawful
act.135
In addition, the canon of statutory construction stating that remedial
legislation, such as Title VII, should be liberally construed further supports
imposing individual liability upon an agent. 36 Nonetheless, despite strong
arguments for imposing individual liability upon an agent under Title VII, the
majority of the circuits have reached the opposite conclusion.'37
These courts, like the Seventh Circuit in Williams v. Banning, reach this
result by reading the insertion of "agent" into the definition of employer as
providing for respondeat superior liability as opposed to agent liability.'
However, a plain language argument against this interpretation contends that
such a reading reduces the agent clause to surplusage because "[a]bsent this
clause, Title VII would nevertheless permit respondeat superior liability
against employers for the acts of their agents under common law liability
principles."'139 The argument follows that, unless Congress clearly indicates
to the contrary, the courts should not construe a statute in a way that renders
part of the statute mere surplusage.' 40
Nonetheless, the Seventh Circuit, like the majority of the circuits, also
relied on Title VII's remedial scheme as evidence that Congress did not intend
to impose individual liability under the Act.' 4' This argument contends that,
because Congress chose not to impose Title VII liability upon an employer
with less than fifteen employees, Congress similarly did not intend to impose
individual liability upon a single agent.
134. For a discussion regarding the legislative intent and purpose behind Title VII
and its 1991 amendments, see supra notes 34-73 and accompanying text.
135. See Goldberg, supra note 133, at 583-89.
136. See supra note 36 and accompanying text citing this canon of statutory
construction. See also Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate
Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to be Construed, 3 VAND.
L. REv. 395, 401 (1950) (citing this canon of statutory construction).
137. See supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text (identifying the circuits that
have rejected individual liability under Title VII).
138. For a discussion of the respondeat superior argument, see supra notes 41-44
and accompanying text.
139. Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1319 (Parker, J., dissenting).
140. Id. See also New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1044 (2d Cir.
1985) (stating this same surplusage argument).
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While such an argument carries intuitive appeal, the plain language of
Title VII's definition of employer could override this logic. The principle of
separation of powers supports judicial deference to the language of the
statute.'42 Moreover, a court should only reject the clear language of a
statute when that meaning would lead to absurd results. 43 Imposing liability
on a single agent (of an employer with fifteen or more employees) while
denying Title VII liability to an employer with fourteen employees may seem
unfair but clearly does not rise to the level of absurdity. In any case, the
legislature always retains the power to amend the statute if the legislature finds
the results of applying the plain language unsatisfactory.
Significantly, the Seventh Circuit decided this case in the context of a
sexual harassment suit where the employer was found not liable for the
agent's violative acts. By refusing to impose individual liability upon the
agent, the plaintiff was left with no Title VII remedy. To secure a recovery
directly against her alleged harasser, the plaintiff must now turn to the tort
cause of action, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress ("IIED"). IIED
presents the plaintiff with a significantly more onerous burden of proof"'
and would most likely provide relief for only the most egregious acts.
Therefore, the Seventh Circuit takes a more restrictive view of the "employer"
definition than, for instance, the Fourth Circuit, which only denied individual
liability for an agent's decisions that were characterized as "plainly delegable"
and did not consider the act of sexual harassment, a task outside the agent's
scope of authority.'45
While the Eight Circuit has not formally addressed the issue under Title
VII, its decision in Lenhardt v. Basic Institute of Technology, Inc.'46 denied
individual liability under the Missouri Human Rights Act ("MHRA") 47 in
a disability discrimination case. The Eighth Circuit substantially relied upon
142. Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469,475 (1992); Tomka,
66 F.3d at 1319 (Parker, J., dissenting).
143. Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1319 (Parker, J., dissenting).
144. For a discussion of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, see supra
notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
145. For a cite to the Fourth Circuit position, see supra note 76.
146. 55 F.3d 377 (8th Cir. 1995).
147. Mo. REV. STAT. § 213.010 (1994). Section 213.010(6) defines "employer"
as:
"Employer" includes the state, or any political subdivision thereof, or any
person employing six or more persons within the state, and any person
directly acting in the interest of an employer, but does not include
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the same arguments advanced in Williams v. Banning.'48 Consequently,
Williams v. Banning and Lenherdt v. Basic Institute of Technology, Inc.'s
denial of individual liability under Title VII and the MHRA, respectively, may
be predictive of how the Eighth Circuit might rule on agent liability under
Title VII.
VI. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, Williams v. Banning reflects the majority position of the
appellate courts that refuse to impose individual liability upon an employer's
agents under Title VII. In reaching this decision, the appellate courts depart
from the clear meaning of the statutory text and, instead, rely upon their view
of legislative intent and purpose as gleaned from the logic behind the Act's
remedial scheme.
CHERYL L. FEUTZ
148. Lenherdt, 55 F.3d at 379-81.
[Vol. 62
22
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 62, Iss. 1 [1997], Art. 12
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol62/iss1/12
